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The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has beenAbstract
using a cost-effectiveness threshold range between £20 000 and £30 000 for over
7 years. What the cost-effectiveness threshold represents, what the appropriate
level is for NICE to use, and what the other factors are that NICE should consider
have all been the subject of much discussion. In this article, we briefly review
these questions, provide a critical assessment of NICE’s utilization of the incre-
mental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) threshold to inform its guidance, and
suggest ways in which NICE’s utilization of the ICER threshold could be
developed to promote the efficient use of health service resources.
We conclude that it is feasible and probably desirable to operate an explicit
single threshold rather than the current range; the threshold should be seen as a
threshold at which ‘other’ criteria beyond the ICER itself are taken into account;
interventions with a large budgetary impact may need to be subject to a lower
threshold as they are likely to displace more than the marginal activities; reim-
bursement at the threshold transfers the full value of an innovation to the
manufacturer.
Positive decisions above the threshold on the grounds of innovation reduce
population health; the value of the threshold should be reconsidered regularly to
ensure that it captures the impact of changes in efficiency and budget over time;
the use of equity weights to sustain a positive recommendation when the ICER is
above the threshold requires knowledge of the equity characteristics of those
patients who bear the opportunity cost. Given the barriers to obtaining this
knowledge and knowledge about the characteristics of typical beneficiaries of UK
NHS care, caution is warranted before accepting claims from special pleaders;
uncertainty in the evidence base should not be used to justify a positive recom-
mendation when the ICER is above the threshold. The development of a pro-
gramme of disinvestment guidance would enable NICE and the NHS to be more
confident that the net health benefit of the Technology Appraisal Programme is
positive.
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1. Background automatically be defined as not cost effective or
below which it would. Given the fixed budget of the
The National Institute for Health and Clinical NHS, the appropriate threshold is that of the oppor-
Excellence (NICE) is charged with the task of con- tunity cost of programmes displaced by new, more
sidering both the effectiveness and cost effective- costly technologies. However, estimating this thres-
ness of treatments and then making recommenda- hold would require complete information about the
tions as to the provision of such treatments within costs and QALYs from all competing healthcare
the UK NHS. Cost-effectiveness analysis assesses programmes and the Committee does not have this
two or more alternative courses of action in terms of information. Furthermore, the threshold will change
their costs and benefits. The comparison is summa- over time as the budget for healthcare changes.
rized using the expected incremental cost-effective- Although the use of a threshold is inappropriate,
ness ratio (ICER). This is a measure of the addition- comparisons of the most plausible ICER of a partic-
al cost per additional unit of health gain produced by ular technology compared with other programmes
one intervention compared with another. NICE’s that are currently funded are possible and are a
preferred form of cost-effectiveness analysis uses legitimate reference for the Committee.”[1]
the QALY to describe the outcome of each interven- This statement acknowledges the importance of
tion. By extension, the preferred form of ICER is the considering the opportunity cost of implementing
cost per QALY gained. Within the NICE appraisal new treatments given a fixed threshold – whilst
process, the ICER for each technology is compared conversely suggesting that, since the data required
with a threshold value (generally accepted as having to estimate the threshold quantitatively are not avail-
an upper limit of £30 000) to establish whether the able, it is inappropriate to use a threshold. Our
technology represents an efficient use of limited interpretation of this apparently contradictory state-
NHS resources. ment is that it is use of a particular threshold that is
The objective of this article is to review the to be avoided, hence NICE’s emphasis on a range.
current state of knowledge regarding the cost-effec- The guide then goes on to consider a range of
tiveness threshold, the principles of its use in health- possible other factors to take into account in cases of
care resource allocation decisions and any argu- technologies with ICERs at the lower and upper
ments for and against changing the threshold from boundary of the range:
the current range of £20 000–30 000.
“Below a most plausible ICER of £20,000/QALY,Section 2 summarizes the statements in the 2004 judgements about the acceptability of a technology
Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal re- as an effective use of NHS resources are based
garding the value and use of the cost-effectiveness primarily on the cost-effectiveness estimate. Above a
threshold. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature most plausible ICER of £20,000/QALY, judgements
on the use of the cost-effectiveness threshold in about the acceptability of the technology as an effec-
resource allocation decision making. Section 4 dis- tive use of NHS resources are more likely to make
cusses key implications of using an ICER threshold more explicit reference to factors including:
to promote population health gain from the NHS
• the degree of uncertainty surrounding the calcu-budget. Section 5 considers the issue of whether the lation of ICERsNICE threshold should change; and section 6 at-
• the innovative nature of the technologytempts to summarize the key observations of the
• the particular features of the condition and popu-paper. lation receiving the technology
• where appropriate, the wider societal costs and2. What the Current Methods Guide Says
benefits.”[1]
The 2004 Methods Guide[1] refers several times This approach echoes ideas advanced by
to the cost-effectiveness threshold. In chapter 6 Akehurst[2] in 2002, and seems to imply that NICE’s
(page 33), it states: ‘effective threshold’ is actually £20 000 per QALY.
“The Appraisal Committee does not use a fixed When cost-effectiveness ratios for a treatment ex-
ICER threshold above which a technology would ceed this, the Appraisal Committee considers
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(i) whether the characteristics of the condition or whilst the latter treated NICE decisions as discrete
population receiving the treatment would lead them choice experiments.
to value the health gain produced by the intervention Rawlins and Culyer[5] identified an increasing
more highly than the estimate made in the analysis; likelihood of rejection as the ICER increased be-
(ii) whether innovative characteristics of the inter- yond £15 000, with few interventions being ap-
vention are such as to require explicit consideration proved with an ICER >£30 000 (figure 1). Devlin
of the Secretary of State’s instruction to give due and Parkin,[6] in contrast, estimated the threshold to
weight to innovativeness, despite the excess oppor- be “somewhat higher than the £20,000 – £30,000
tunity cost from a purely efficiency perspective; and which NICE has publicly identified.”
(iii) whether other benefits to society, outside of There are several problems with basing the cur-
those considered by the cost-effectiveness analysis, rent threshold on previous decisions. First, it is not
are such that it is ‘socially desirable’ for the treat- necessarily desirable for current decisions to use the
ment to be made available. same decision rule as for previous ones; consistency
The proposed role of uncertainty in decision of decision rule (the cost-effectiveness threshold)
making is unclear. The text may mean that when the can conflict with consistency of objective (maximiz-
ICER exceeds the lower bound of the threshold ing expected health gain). We discuss in more detail
range, the committee will seek greater levels of why the threshold might change over time in section
certainty to support a positive recommendation. 4. Second, this approach requires that previous deci-
However, the text is also consistent with Akehurst’s sions either took no account of any ‘other’ consider-
proposal[3] that when there is great uncertainty about ations or that any such consideration was judged not
an ICER in excess of the threshold value, it is sufficient to have an impact on the decision, other-
appropriate to treat the estimate as not significantly wise the linking of particular ICERs to a particular
different from the threshold value. threshold value will have (largely unknowable) bi-
Use of additional criteria is not inconsistent with ases.
the operation of an explicit, single threshold value,
3.2 Setting to Determine the Optimalnor is it inconsistent with much of the literature on
Healthcare Budgetsocial preferences over healthcare resource alloca-
tion.[3] However, as we discuss in section 4.2, there Some have suggested that the appropriate process
are substantive issues concerning the ways in which is to identify the marginal value that society attaches
such additional considerations should be operation-
to health.[7] NICE itself has promoted two research
alized. projects to examine what value people in the UK
attach to an additional QALY. If the cost-effective-
3. Setting the Threshold
ness threshold were set by such an empirically re-
There is significant argument about how the cost-
effectiveness threshold should be determined. Three
broad approaches have been proposed: (i) it should
be inferred from previous decisions; (ii) it should be
set so as to determine the optimal healthcare budget;
and (iii) it should be set so as to exhaust an exoge-
nously determined budget.[4]
3.1 Inferring the Value from
Previous Decisions
Rawlins and Culyer[5] and Devlin and Parkin[6]
made two attempts to infer NICE’s cost-effective-
ness threshold from reviews of previous decisions.
The former was an essentially qualitative analysis,
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Fig. 1. Relationship between cost effectiveness and probability of
rejection (reproduced from Rawlins and Culyer[5]).
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vealed monetary value, the implication is that inter- sistent with the value attached to a life in other parts
ventions having an ICER below that value should be of the public sector. Whilst health and life are the
approved. The healthcare budget would then be primary (although not sole) objectives of the NHS,
whatever sum was required to implement the they are not the primary objectives of other public
purchases. Setting the threshold would thus effec- sector activities. The budgets allocated to these dif-
tively determine the NHS’s budget.[8] The budget ferent activities by parliament imply a relative valu-
would be demonstrably consistent with the value ation of these objectives as well as the impact on
that ‘society’ attached to health, and the state would health and length of life. It would be a major task to
be committed to increase the budget so long as the isolate the ‘health component’ in these other activi-
ICERs for new interventions fell below the thres- ties. Currently, only transport uses an explicit value
hold. and, as one of the authors of this briefing paper has
Three approaches have been suggested for quan- previously observed, “NICE simply does not have
tifying the marginal value of health: (i) discovering (and nor is it mandated to acquire) the kind of
the willingness to pay for health gain of a represen- information about outputs in non-health sectors that
tative sample of society;[7] (ii) using the value of life/ it would need to form necessary judgements about
health employed in other areas of public sector the marginal costs and benefits of health spending
resource allocation;[9] and (iii) setting it equal to versus spending in other areas of public services.”[4]
GDP per capita.[10] Thus, although it may be intuitively appealing, it is
If there was a direct link between society’s will- not feasible for the threshold to be set (by NICE) by
ingness to pay for health gain and the budget of the reference to other public sector activities.
healthcare system, setting the threshold with refer- Williams[10] suggested that a ‘common sense’
ence to it would seem appropriate. However, in the
value for the threshold would be per capita GDP. AtUK, as in many other countries, the budget of the
the time of lecture, this was somewhat lower thanhealthcare system is determined in large part by
the bottom of the threshold range used by NICE.parliament and is done (doubtless imperfectly) by
The appeal of this proposal is that, if every memberbroad assessments of the marginal value of exten-
of society were to be given a ‘fair share’ of asions of a wide variety of public programmes and of
nation’s wealth, they would receive the per capitathe value of purchasing power left in the pockets of
GDP. The maximum they could therefore spend onconsumers. The budget allocated to healthcare by
health gain in any one year would be the per capitaparliament, therefore, already contains an implicit
GDP. Three significant problems present them-value of marginal health gain (MHG) – relative to
selves. First, the approach implies that the societyalternative uses of public funds. It is difficult to see
might be willing to devote all its wealth to health-how experimental methods for revealing the social
care, which is manifestly not the case. Second, thevalue of a QALY could capture these opportunity
same thought experiment will yield the same ‘maxi-costs more effectively (or more legitimately) than
mum’ for any good or service in GDP and so pro-parliament. To substitute the ‘direct democracy’ of
vides no basis whatever for choosing between any ofpublic opinion for a parliamentary process plainly
them. Third, the average cost effectiveness ofalso raises constitutional issues well beyond the
healthcare can be at or below per capita GDP withscope of this article.
the cost effectiveness of marginal programmes be-The healthcare system is not the only area of
ing markedly higher thanks to diminishing marginalpublic policy concerned with promoting health. For
returns. NICE has to establish whether a new inter-example, transport investment decisions typically
vention is more cost effective than the marginaltake account of the expected impact on injury and
interventions that would have to be displaced indeath rates when appraising road building schemes.
order to pay for it from a constant budget. Use of anIt is therefore intuitively appealing that the value of
arbitrary average risks rejecting interventions thathealth ought to be consistent across public sector
were more cost effective than those already pro-activities. Loomes[9] has suggested that the cost-
vided.effectiveness threshold should be set at a level con-
 2008 Adis Data Information BV. All rights reserved. Pharmacoeconomics 2008; 26 (9)
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3.3 Setting to Optimally Exhaust a Budget available technologies: those in use as well as those
that could be used but are not, ordered by contribu-
From the beginning, NICE’s use of cost-effec- tion to health gain.
tiveness analysis has been perceived as a means of It is immediately apparent that NICE confronts
promoting the efficient use of available NHS resour- three potentially interesting MHGs, the size of none
ces.[11,12] The cost-effectiveness threshold ought of which it can be sure. E–a is the actual MHG
thus to be the cost per QALY of the least efficient implied by current use in the NHS. It is what the
funded treatment (i.e. the intervention with the high- current ‘threshold’ would appear to be if a compre-
est cost per QALY). For a new intervention to add to hensive assessment were to be made of the ways in
health, it must be more efficient per unit of resource which current NHS resources are used. E–c is the
than the least efficient currently funded intervention health gain to be achieved from adopting the best
and ought to displace it, in whole or part, so that the technology not currently in use in the NHS. E–b is
marginal productivity of each intervention in terms the threshold above which technologies ought to be
of health was everywhere equalized. Here too, how- adopted and below which they ought not. The incor-
ever, is another evident informational challenge. If poration of any technology not in current use with an
identifying the marginal interventions for disinvest- MHG above E–b would represent an increase in
ment is too difficult, the threshold requires an alter- health outcomes as long as it displaces a technology
native justification.[12] Here, we need to tread with with a lower MHG (in the range E’–E). The optimal
care. On the one hand, there is an issue of principle: solution is plainly to cease using all those technolo-
what the threshold ought to represent, a value judge- gies in the range E’–E on H–a and substitute for
ment; and on the other, an empirical question: the them all those in the range E–E" (= E’–E) on c–f.
value it should take in any specific context.
 If the function of NICE is to substitute more
In figure 2, the range of technologies in O–E efficient interventions for less efficient ones, it can
embodies those extant and provided in the NHS. Let do this through specifying a ‘working’ cost-effec-
us assume that all provide positive MHG and that tiveness threshold, reflecting the Institute’s estimate
the least productive one has an MHG of E–a. How- of the ICER of the least cost-effective activity
ever, there are many technologies either extant or undertaken by the NHS. This working estimate can
emergent that are not currently provided within the be drawn from (i) the incomplete evidence base on
NHS. These technologies are ranked in a separate the cost effectiveness of interventions that the NHS
downward-sloping function to the right of E, la- does provide; and (ii) stakeholders’ personal and
belled c–f. A composite MHG curve is the horizon- professional knowledge of the likely value of funded
tal sum of the two lines, H–d–e, which combines all interventions, for which formal evaluations are not
available.[1,8] Over time, this ‘working’ ICER can be
adjusted in a casuistical fashion reflecting develop-
ments in the published evidence base and evidence
on the efficiency of disinvestments made to fund the
recommended interventions, and changes in the
healthcare budget and in judgments about the effi-
ciency of healthcare production.
Although the ‘threshold-searcher’ model of
Culyer et al.[8] describes how resource allocation
processes can utilize ICERs for healthcare resource
allocation decisions at the margin, the authors did
not address the frequently cited criticisms of Birch
and Gafni,[13-16] who have repeatedly argued that
decision makers cannot maximize health gain from
limited resources by using ICERs in isolation from
information on budget impact. To do so, they say, is
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Fig. 2. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence as a
threshold searcher (reproduced from Culyer et al.,[8] with permis-
sion).
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a recipe for “continued expansion of expendi- technologies will have to be displaced). In this way,
ture.”[13-16] Their argument is that the opportunity allocation processes based on a cost-effectiveness
cost of a positive decision is determined by the total threshold can fully capture the opportunity cost of
budgetary impact, not the ICER. It is possible for the both positive and negative investment recommenda-
total budget for an existing health intervention to be tions.
less than that for the new intervention even though The rate of change in the productivity of health-
the new intervention has a lower ICER. If the new care also matters. Thus, when productivity is rising
intervention is mandated on the basis of the ICER through the use of relatively efficient technologies,
alone, then extra funds would need to be found.[14] the substitution of generics for branded products,
and so on, the health production function is dis-
3.4 Relationship with Budget Impact placed upwards (i.e. greater returns in health are
obtained from healthcare inputs). As the budgetThe threshold-searcher model[8] can be used to
increases, the cost-effectiveness threshold shouldexplore the relationship between budget impact and
also increase, i.e. less efficient interventions shouldthe cost-effectiveness threshold. The threshold is the
be incorporated into the portfolio of treatments pro-inverse of the MHG per unit of expenditure of the
vided by the NHS, provided that the productivity ofleast efficient intervention in current use. In figure 2,
existing healthcare activities grows at a slower ratethe substitution of a more for a less efficient inter-
than the budget (in figure 2, an expansion in thevention causes the MHG of the least efficient inter-
budget is represented as an extension of the line H–avention to rise. Thus, in figure 2, after the process of
to the right – the MHG of the least efficient interven-substituting more efficient technologies for less effi-
tion that can be funded is lower the further to thecient ones, the MHG is E–b. Future interventions
right you go and thus the threshold is higher). Inwill have to have an MHG ≥E–b, rather than E–a, to
times of rapid expansion of the NHS budget, such asjustify incorporation into the portfolio of funded
have been seen over the past 7 years, the counter-treatments. As a result, the threshold for future deci-
vailing effects of the implementation of new treat-sions decreases. The next candidate intervention
ments and increases in the budget may have madewill need to be even more efficient in order to justify
the adoption of a cost-effectiveness range a (fortui-its inclusion as a funded intervention. This is the
tously) appropriate approach. Conversely, whencase even if the budget impact of the substitution is
budgetary growth is less than the net budget impactneutral, i.e. when the budget impact of the new
of investment and disinvestment decisions, the cost-intervention is identical to the budget impact of the
effectiveness threshold should fall to reflect the in-displaced intervention. Thus, the cost-effectiveness
creased efficiency of the marginal intervention.threshold is, as a matter of logic, endogenous once
These relative rates of growth of the budget andone allows for dynamic interactions, even though, in
productivity of healthcare also have implications,an overall sense, it is constrained by the budget
which do not concern us here, for discounting.[17]determined by parliament.
To the extent that the total cost of the new inter-
3.5 Summary
vention is greater than that of the procedure it re-
places, a positive recommendation requires more The budget of the NHS is set by parliament.
disinvestment until the budgetary impact of succes- NICE is charged “to appraise the clinical benefits
sive substitutions is neutral and the budget con- and costs of such health care interventions as may be
straint holds. This means that the cost-effectiveness notified by the Secretary of State or the National
threshold for an intervention with a large budgetary Assembly for Wales … and to reach a judgement as
impact should be lower than that for an intervention to whether, on balance, this intervention can be
with a small impact (i.e. because the lower the recommended as a cost effective use of NHS and
threshold the higher the MHG; and when the greater Personal and Social Services (PSS) resources.”[18] It
the budget impact, the greater the amount of current is clear that NICE is not mandated to determine the
activity that has to be displaced to fund the new budget of the NHS, and since setting a threshold
technology and therefore more efficient current independently of the budget is logically equivalent
 2008 Adis Data Information BV. All rights reserved. Pharmacoeconomics 2008; 26 (9)
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to determining the budget, NICE cannot be mandat- ness threshold implies that the full value of the
ed to do that either. The appropriate approach to innovation (greater efficacy) is captured by the man-
NICE’s cost-effectiveness threshold is therefore to ufacturer. As the manufacturers are typically profit
see it as an equilibrating variable that promotes the maximizers, they will seek to price as close to this
efficient (health maximizing) use of a fixed budget. point as possible. Strictly, what is happening is that
the cost-effectiveness information is information not
previously available to manufacturers about the4. Implications of Setting the Threshold
maximum willingness to pay of the demanders andto Optimally Exhaust a Fixed Budget
makes the task of perfect price discrimination, or the
use of an ‘all-or-nothing’ demand curve, more readi-
4.1 Considering Innovation ly achievable by producers.[20]
Figure 3[19] shows the total health gain to the While it is appropriate for manufacturers to ap-
NHS population under three scenarios. Consider an propriate a share of the value of innovations, it
intervention costing £20 000 per patient for a health would be unwise to create a system under which
gain of 2 QALYs. At this price, the ICER is below they extract it all. The public sector subsidises R&D
the cost-effectiveness threshold and the net health in a number of ways, through publicly funded re-
benefit of the intervention is 1 QALY per person. At search, tax incentives and research infrastructure
a price of £40 000 and 2 QALYs gained, the ICER is investment. Therefore, even if society were uncon-
exactly equal to the threshold, and at this point, the cerned about who benefits from innovation (NHS
net benefit from the new intervention is zero, the patients or the pharmaceutical industry), it would
loss of health from displaced technologies being the not be efficient to allow full appropriation of the
same as the gain. value of innovation by the manufacturer. However,
However, if the new treatment is more effective society is most certainly concerned about this distri-
than existing treatments, setting the price at a level bution, and it is reasonable that at least some of the
that produces an ICER equal to the cost-effective- benefits of innovation should accrue to NHS pa-
£20 000
per QALY
Price = P* £40 000
Cost-effectiveness
threshold 
£20 000 per QALY
QALYs gained
Cost
£30 000
per QALY
Price > P* £60 000
32
£10 000
per QALY
Price < P* £20 000
1
Net health benefit
1 QALY
Net health benefit
–1 QALY
Fig. 3. Threshold and health gain (reproduced from Claxton et al.[19]). P* = maximum price the NHS can afford or the value of the
technology. 
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tients. In pharmaceuticals, as in other industries possible to identify efficiency without making as-
where innovation is protected, society currently per- sumptions about the relative value of additional
mits monopoly rents during patent protection, but QALYs to different people. Interpersonal compari-
does not allow full appropriation by, for example, sons are therefore inherent in the process of estab-
facilitating perfect price discrimination. lishing efficiency.[21] An important further consider-
Such concerns as this are somewhat tangential to ation relates to the wider opportunity cost of Ap-
those of the Institute. However, of direct relevance praisal Committee decisions. When the threshold is
for NICE is the use of innovation as an argument for being used to allocate a fixed budget, there is not
recommending interventions having ICERs above one category of patient interest but two: those pa-
the threshold. When the ICER is close to, or at, the tients who would receive the new treatment or some
threshold value, the full value of the innovation is alternative and those patients who bear the opportu-
already being paid to the manufacturer. To recom- nity cost of its provision (i.e. those whose service
mend an intervention when the ICER is above the
availability is reduced by virtue of the expenditure
threshold is to pay more for the innovation than it is
on the new treatment).
worth (in terms of the population’s health). Promot-
We have already observed that NICE does noting population health is consistent only with recom-
know, and probably can not know, which patientsmending treatments with ICERs that are below the
bear the opportunity cost of its appraisal guidance. Ifthreshold. It seems inappropriate for NICE to seek to
honour its obligations to promote innovation NICE recommends an intervention on equity
through such a subsidy and at possible cost to NHS grounds, it necessarily has to make assumptions
patients. NICE’s contribution to innovation is more about the characteristics of those patients who bear
likely to be realized effectively through clarity and the opportunity cost. Specifically, in making a posi-
consistency in the criteria that it uses to make its tive recommendation, it must assume that the health
recommendations. The ultimate benefit is to bring gain forgone by those who bear the opportunity cost
the desire of the NHS to use interventions that are no is valued less than that of those who receive the
more costly than they need be into the research plans benefit.
of manufacturers, so that the market is not disrupted
Procedural justice would seem to require that theby unforeseen changes in requirements and innova-
character of the claims of the anonymous bearers oftion is of the sort that maximizes and properly
the opportunity cost be properly considered in NICErewards industry’s contribution to the nation’s
appraisals. In particular, when claims are made byhealth.
advocacy and other groups about the special nature,
need, etc., of the people they represent, NICE must
4.2 Equity Arguments do their best to assess the extent to which these
claims carry greater weight than the claims that
could be made by those bearing the opportunity cost.The threshold represents the opportunity cost of
Given the typical pattern of NHS expenditure, thethe implementation, i.e. the health gain forgone by
typical bearer of the opportunity cost is, for exam-other patients. While the threshold is critical to the
ple, likely to be elderly and in the last year of life. Itdetermination of the most efficient (i.e. health maxi-
does not therefore appear intuitively plausible tomizing) use of NHS resources, the Appraisal Com-
suppose that the weight to be attached to benefi-mittee also considers whether there is any ground in
ciaries’ health gains must necessarily be higher thanequity for weighting the health gains and losses of
that attached to the anonymous losers. Plainly this isdifferent people differentially or for recommending
an area in which information is poor and broadtechnologies with relatively high ICERs on grounds
generalizations will, for some time, have to substi-of their beneficial impact on equity.[1]
tute for more specific identification of the character-While efficiency, in the sense of health max-
istics of ‘typical’ displaced health gain. The matterimization, is a major concern of NICE’s Appraisal
Committee, it is not the only one; nor, indeed, is it is ripe for research.
 2008 Adis Data Information BV. All rights reserved. Pharmacoeconomics 2008; 26 (9)
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4.3 Monitoring and some care as they take no account of the many
Recommending Disinvestment interventions that impact on quality of life rather
than survival. This said, the results are consistent
with a central estimate across all programme bud-The 2004 Methods Guide avoids defining an
gets around the lower limit of the current range.explicit threshold on the grounds that the correct
The variation in thresholds between programmefigure cannot be known. However, both the pre-
budgets has implications for NICE. It implies thatviously suggested casuistry (building up of specific
the opportunity cost of a NICE recommendationcases) and the threshold searching model imply that
also varies depending upon where it falls, so it mayit may be reasonable for NICE to utilize explicit
be efficient or inefficient dependent on local circum-thresholds that might converge over time on a ‘best
stance. The risk of NICE guidance being inefficientestimate’. A crucial part of this search process
will depend inter alia on (i) the degree to whichwould be the identification of activities for disin-
national resource allocation captures geographicalvestment or, when there is budgetary growth, to
variation in health needs; (ii) the degree to whichidentify other planned investments that ought to be
local resource allocation processes reflect variationsabandoned in order to fund NICE recommendations.
in health needs between patient groups; andThere has been little research on either selecting
(iii) whether the technology appraisal programme isor implementing disinvestments in the NHS. NICE
focussed on those areas with the greatest potentialhas commissioned research from Brunel and City
for increasing the efficiency of NHS activity. LocalUniversities, which is yet to be published.[22] Should
commissioners will almost certainly need guidanceit turn out that actual disinvestments have tended to
on how best to identify and then manage disinvest-be more cost effective than the NICE recommended
ments and postponement of planned investmentsinterventions, there would be prima facie evidence
following NICE recommendations. It seems obvi-for supposing either that the current threshold is too
ous that the criteria they use ought not to conflicthigh or that NHS trusts and commissioners were
with those used by NICE (though doubtless supple-making poor decisions at their levels. Discovering
mented by further criteria).which the case was would plainly be an important
Culyer et al.[8] suggested that NICE should ac-piece of work. However, it will not be easy to
tively make both disinvestment and investment re-discover. Local commissioners’ choices will be de-
commendations. The Institute has started to exploretermined by several factors, including their total
this possibility.[24] External organizations have alsobudgets, cost structures, the case mixes of the popu-
started to recommend that the NHS, via NICE orlations they serve and even the ease of implementa-
other routes, should disinvest from activities nottion. As these factors vary across Primary Care
having a robust evidence base.[25] Most recently, theTrusts (PCTs), the threshold is also likely to vary by
House of Commons Select Committee recommen-PCT, and therefore whether NICE appraisal gui-
ded that NICE should appraise potential candidatesdance has a positive or negative impact on the
for disinvestment, commenting that it was unaccept-efficiency of local healthcare will also vary by PCT.
able that the Institute had ignored the Committee’sMartin et al.[23] examined the actual changes in
earlier recommendation to this effect.[26] Unfortu-programme budgets and health across PCTs and
nately, the catalogue of procedures for which theestimated the average budget elasticity of health,
evidence base is poor or absent is very long and,that is, the proportionate changes in health resulting
where there is advantage to be had from disinvest-from marginal changes to programme budgets. They
ment, it is unlikely to be the case that the scale ofprovided empirical estimates of the cost-effective-
disinvestment required entails the entire eliminationness threshold expressed as life-years gained. They
of a procedure. So the task of specifying disinvest-reported a range from £7397 for respiratory prob-
ment guidance is by no means easy.lems to £26 453 for diabetes mellitus (year 2005–6
values). The threshold estimates for cancer and cir- The use of a cost-effectiveness threshold is, at its
culation problems were £13 931 and £8426, respec- core, about matching investment and disinvestment
tively. These figures need to be interpreted with to increase the total health produce by the health
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service. To date, NICE has focussed its efforts on tional source of uncertainty would be significant,
investment. Knowing what in fact is disinvested given all the other major uncertainties facing indus-
from can provide some insight into whether, on try (such as the high failure rates in phase III drug
average, NICE appraisal guidance is improving the development), is unclear. Current pricing arrange-
efficiency of the NHS. In the future, a programme of ments allow companies to amortize the cost of these
disinvestment guidance, to balance the investment failures through the price of future successes, so the
guidance, might give the public and the NHS greater system may even encourage unnecessarily high-risk
confidence that the net benefit of the NICE Apprais- investments. Changes in the threshold could be used
al Programme was positive. to signal to the pharmaceutical industry and others
the changes in the efficiency in the NHS that the
5. The Changing Threshold Institute was established to promote, and allow the
industry to incorporate these changes into its invest-The Chair of NICE recently observed that the
ment appraisal processes. This in turn would reduce
current threshold range has been utilized for 7 years
the risk of treatments coming to market that did not
and noted that the methods review process would deliver sufficient additional health gain to justify the
need to consider whether the range should change or price consistent with an acceptable return on invest-
remain the same.[27]
ment. What would also help would be the wide
promulgation of the principles upon which changes5.1 Empirical Estimation
in the threshold would be made, thus enabling future
The House of Commons Health Committee changes to be anticipated.
thought that the choice of threshold was “of serious The empirical evidence of Martin et al.[23] indi-
concern.”[26] The grounds for this concern were that, cated that even the lower end of the current cost-
“it is not based on empirical research and is not effectiveness range may be too high and likely to
directly related to the NHS budget. It seems to be lead to less efficient treatments being implemented
higher than the threshold used by PCTs for treat- at the cost of more efficient ones. The Select Com-
ments not assessed by NICE.”[26] mittee report observes that the current threshold is
The Institute’s response to the Health Commit- higher than the ICER used by PCTs in their commis-
tee’s comments identified 17 technology appraisals sioning processes.[26] Thus, there is a prima facie
that had produced costs savings and stressed that case for considering reducing the threshold. How-
most of the recommendations from the clinical ever, it maybe premature to substantially change the
guidelines programme – if implemented – would threshold on the basis of the current narrow range of
save the NHS money.[28] It went on to highlight the studies.
range of knowledge-promotion activities it is pursu- The efficiency of NICE guidance may be pro-
ing to promote efficiency in clinical practice and moted without changing the threshold. The 2004
commissioning. Whilst these are important and val- Methods Guide indicated that £20 000 is the thres-
uable activities, it would seem appropriate, given the hold at which criteria other than the ICER come into
mandatory nature of guidance from the Technology play. A substantial proportion of the treatments ap-
Appraisal Programme, that the value of the thres- proved by NICE have been in this range. Modifying
hold gives the NHS and the people it serves confi- the utilization of these ‘other factors’ in line with the
dence that the opportunity cost of the programme is arguments we have set out would have the effect of
less than the value of the health gain it produces. strengthening the lower bound of the current range
as the effective threshold, and thus promote the
5.2 Should the Threshold Change? efficiency of future NICE guidance.
A disadvantage of using a moving/converging
6. Conclusions
threshold, or one that was subject to periodic adjust-
ment, is that it would evidently introduce an addi- The incremental cost-effectiveness threshold, as
tional uncertainty and provide a less secure environ- used by NICE, is a means for promoting the opti-
ment for industrial innovation. Whether this addi- mum allocation of a fixed budget. It is not necessari-
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